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Chapter 1 Why are uncertainty, ambiguity and paradox important for managers? 
In today’s organizations leaders and managers are dealing with a great deal of uncertainty 
and ambiguity and must straddle a number of paradoxes. They are obliged to exercise a 
degree of control, and yet they must encourage their staff to be creative and independent 
thinkers.  On the one hand, they may be very experienced, but on the other their experience 
may blind them to novel opportunities which emerge in complex environments. Senior 
teams are often encouraged to change and to innovate, and at the same time they are 
expected stand firm for the traditional values, and the ‘brand’ which their organization 
represents. Paradoxically they are enjoined to change in order to stay the same: in other 
words they have to innovate to sustain organizational continuity. 
And yet, despite the uncertain environment and contradictory injunctions, a lot of talk in 
organizations, and in management literature, is highly purposeful and deals in certainties. 
For example the ideal for senior teams is that managers and leaders choose the future for 
their organizations, they set the ‘right’ conditions for their staff to be productive, and they 
can even change the culture. By implication senior managers and leaders get to their exalted 
place in their organizations from knowing what they are doing, and acting ‘appropriately’, 
decisively and authoritatively. Of course this is no different from the dominant assumptions 
in a whole variety of different professions, where there is an equivalence drawn between 
being a professional and certainty. In this context uncertainty, ambiguity and paradox, 
profoundly disturbing and potentially paralysing contradictions, might seem like very 
abstruse subjects to write about in a book about management and organizing. It might seem 
counterintuitive and unhelpful to deal in the ambiguous when I might instead be offering 
prescriptions to managers about how to act, which is the conventional tack to take in a book 
on organizing.  
However, I do so because of my conviction that ultimately it is more helpful, and more 
realistic, to try to find ways of understanding organisational life in all its complexity, its 
blooming, buzzing confusion as William James once referred to experience, rather than 
relying on the thin simplifications which constitute the recommendations of much 
management literature. They are thin simplifications, a phrase I borrow from the political 
scientist James C Scott (1999), because they are abstractions from the rich and complex 
reality from which they are abstracted: in being general they are only generally useful. In my 
view it is just as important to treat what is, no matter how complex and messy, than what 
we think should be if it means that we have to reduce our ideas beyond recognition. It is my 
contention that managers both understand and don’t understand what’s going on in their 
organisation at the same time, and this is a phenomenon worth thinking about and 
exploring. 
First, though, I should deal with the terms I am using to explain briefly what I mean by them. 
As the book proceeds we will look at some of these terms and how they manifest in 
organisational life in more depth but at this stage of the proceedings I understand 
uncertainty as arising from the interweaving of everyone’s intentions. We may start out by 
forming intentions which are permeated by our world view which we formalise in plans, but 
this is also what everyone else is doing at the same time. So uncertainty arises in social life 
because we act into a web of other people’s actions and intentions: we can no more predict 
how we will respond when we encounter other people’s actions than we can always 
anticipate what their actions will be, although we may have strong hunches. We often 
experience a lot of ambiguity, that is to say, where we are alert to a variety of different 
meanings of what is going on, without there necessarily being a relationship between the 
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meanings. Meanwhile, contradictions, for example the injunction to stay the same/innovate, 
may form part of this ambiguity and produce a relationship of negation between two 
different interpretations. Finally, paradox is a particular form of contradiction where to think 
one thing is automatically to call out its polar opposite, both at the same time. Paradox is a 
particular property of thinking which I explore as the book unfolds. 
 
When contradictions present themselves in organisational life there is usually no obvious 
way to proceed, or perhaps there are a variety of ways which all have their upsides and 
downsides (or perhaps all choices are equally bad). Nonetheless and in my experience most 
managers and leaders are already coping relatively well with their own environment of 
uncertainty. They are able to sustain managing and not managing in their various contexts 
reasonably well. However, I experience a lack of facility in being able to talk about precisely 
what they are doing when managers are coping with uncertainty: although they know that 
organizational life is unpredictable if you ask them directly, managers seem to have precious 
few opportunities to explore this consciously and publically. So what I intend to do in this 
book is to focus a bit more on being in control and not in control, on those interstices in 
organizations when it is not always clear what to do, and when there are contradictory 
pressures on managers. If we could dwell with the contradictions for a while and think about 
what might be going on this might be just as helpful as producing a generalised piece of 
advice which bears no relation to the contexts in which managers are obliged to operate. 
 
The central premise of this book, then, is that exploration of ambiguous, contradictory and 
paradoxical experience, where sometimes mutually informing but contradictory ideas arise 
at the same time and potentially confound us may help us understand how to act into the 
unknown. This will involve enquiring into how we make our way with contradictions, and 
what we need to pay attention to and reflect upon as we do so. It requires paying attention 
to how we act when we are not sure what to do and a different way of thinking than using 
logic alone, or disaggregating parts/whole thinking. 
 
Perhaps it would be best to illustrate why I think this area of inquiry is important by means 
of an incident that happened between a colleague and me when I served on a board of 
trustees. Using this as practical example I can then go on to explore some of the themes at 
the heart of the matter for me. 
 
Having values about not having values 
A couple of years ago I was on the board of a not-for-profit organization along with a 
another academic with whom I had some quite large intellectual differences. For the most 
part we could co-operate fairly easily since the job of a board of trustees is essentially to act 
as a critical friend to the director and her senior management team. In general it is not hard 
to develop a way of working together, within the board and between the board and the 
senior management team.  
 
One day my academic colleague and I were both asked to talk to staff about our different 
views of social science to help them with the job they had of carrying out research to 
evaluate the work they were doing. My colleague was director of a unit which specialized in 
running randomized control trials (RCTs) of social development projects. RCTs are at the 
heart of contemporary medical research, and turn on the idea of measuring differences of 
response between groups of randomly selected patients to a particular medical 
intervention. Who receives the treatment is not known to the patients or to the researchers 
administering the trial, and therefore the intention is to remove researcher (and patient) 
prejudice as completely as possible from the experiment. The idea is that it does not matter 
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what a particular expert, or patient, might believe will be effective: what counts is whether 
the experiment shows that it is. In medical research a randomized control trial produces the 
highest form of evidence and is taken to be the ‘gold standard’ against which all other forms 
of evidence are measured. 
 
So in what is known as a double blind randomized trial there would be a large group of 
patients chosen at random and with a particular medical condition who receive a trial drug 
or intervention, a similarly large randomly chosen group of patients with the same condition 
who receive a placebo, i.e. some kind of pill or intervention which is known to have no 
effect, and a randomly chosen group of patients with the same condition who receive 
nothing at all. After a given period measurements are taken to find out if there are any 
statistically significant improvements between the group which actually received the 
treatment and the two which did not. Other statistical tests are run to control for other 
possible confounding variables, such as age or social background, which might be affecting 
the results. The experiment would be written up in a systematic way so that it could be 
copied by any other group of researchers who would then run the experiment again and get 
the same results. If they could, and yet more experiments showed the same outcomes, then 
the results would over time be deemed to be robust. The experiment needs a statistically 
significant number of respondents involved in the study so that variable responses are 
averaged out. 
 
When he took his turn to talk to members of staff about social research, my colleague on 
the board extolled the virtues of randomized control trials in social projects arguing that 
they are the only method which produces scientific evidence. He claimed, rightly in the 
opinion of many natural scientists, they are equally applicable in a social setting; for example 
in projects which are designed to discourage underage young people living in the country in 
developing countries to migrate to the cities where they are easily exploited, the kind of 
project that this particular not-for-profit was designing and managing and was concerned to 
find out if they were effective. 
 
My colleague was setting out the case for what is known as methods-driven research which 
has a number of theoretical assumptions: in other words, a step-wise, logical, linear, 
controlled experimental approach, keeping the researcher as much out of the experiment as 
possible, is the only scientific way to design social research. This method treats a group of 
individuals as separate, discrete units, and looks to find out if a large enough number is 
affected to a large enough degree by a carefully defined social intervention: the central 
causal relationship is between the intervention, broken down to a number of variables, and 
the individual. No account is taken of how individuals may interact with each other in 
response to the intervention.  It produces results which count as evidence and which are 
assumed to be replicable in other settings because it expects the average human responses 
to be similar between groups. Once a researcher finds out ‘what works’, a specific 
intervention has a measurable effect on a significant number of individuals in a group, then 
a researcher can apply this knowledge to ‘scale up’ the intervention or do the same thing 
elsewhere. Scaling up, choosing a much larger group to receive the intervention, will be 
similarly successful because it is merely  the same thing on a bigger scale. Implicitly he was 
also making a case that any other form of research, i.e. any argument I was about to make, 
might be interesting, but would be inferior to what he had just said, because it would be less 
scientific. 
 
There are a variety of experimental methods used in research in the natural sciences, and 
many of them have migrated over to researching social phenomena as well, including in 
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organizational research. RCTs are just the purest example of a broader phenomenon. The 
overwhelming majority of research papers published in academic journals is of an 
experimental nature along the lines discussed above where the researchers keep their 
‘objects’ of research as much at a distance as possible in the quest for evidence. They put 
forward a hypothesis about the application of a particular and definable approach to 
management, and then they measure the results as to whether this proved effective or not. 
 
However, and from my perspective, in social settings RCTs in particular have severe 
limitations and also lead to what I consider to be some very distorting behaviour which call 
into question their usefulness. For example, it makes sense in a medical trial to standardize 
the dose of whatever treatment you are administering to patients. In social settings this 
attempt to standardize leads to the development of manuals and scripts so that social 
workers, say, are encouraged to behave in exactly the same way and deliver as similar a 
social work intervention as possible so that there are not too many confounding variables in 
the project. In other words, and in my view, social development workers are encouraged to 
behave like robots so that they don’t get in the way of the experiment. It seems to me that 
in social development it is precisely the improvisational activities of development workers, 
negotiating a slightly different response with the people they are working with in every case, 
which can make the difference to success or otherwise, because of the uncertainty and 
ambiguity in any given situation, which I started out by defining at the beginning of this 
chapter.  It seems to me that methods-driven approaches are trying to exclude the very 
factors which will cause the intervention to succeed. This is beside the point as to whether 
one adopts a theory of causation that it is the ‘variables’ which make a social project work, 
rather than how the people in the project are co-operating together to make it work. There 
are a number of other critiques that one could make about the use of RCTs in social 
development, for example the tendency to measure quite trivial and observable things and 
to have no views on broader phenomena such as culture, history and power relations, and 
whether a larger group is simply an aggregate of smaller group, which I don’t have the space 
to expand upon here. 
 
When it came to my turn to speak I made an alternative case for what is known as problem-
driven research, as opposed to methods-driven, where the first question arises from a 
particular practice context and focuses on what it is we are trying to find out, which then 
informs the question about which research method is most appropriate. In doing so I was 
pointing out what I saw as the weaknesses in my colleague’s case, based on some of what I 
have set out above. Inevitably when my colleague responded by reiterating his claim that his 
was the only scientific approach, the discussion became heated. This was particularly at the 
point when my colleague informed the staff that he operates according to three principles 
when designing an RCT: that he involves the client group he works with in the design, but 
only if they could offer suggestions which were logically consistent, and whatever they said 
had to be backed up with evidence (i.e. the sort which is provable by RCT), and that 
everyone, including him, left their values at the door. As well as engaging with his argument 
more broadly, noting how he was silencing people who did not conform to his world view 
(just as I felt he was trying to silence me) I also pointed out to him that he had just 
demonstrated, paradoxically, that he had strong values about not having values and that 
logic alone was insufficient for stating or resolving practical problems. His stated values were 
of universalism and disinterestedness as a higher order of social engagement, but he was 
unaware of how he might be silencing people. Despite claiming that his position was logical 
and scientific, I told him I thought his argument also rested on rhetoric, paradox and power 
relations, as well as questions of method. 
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Engaging with uncertainty, contradiction and paradox as a way into ethics 
Looking back on this incident now I am wondering what possessed us both to get so caught 
up with each other in front of staff whom we were supposed to be helping. I wonder what 
they thought of this back and forth between two academics who were members of their 
board, and who mostly were able to co-operate together to support their work, but here 
were clearly unable to do so on this occasion. And I suppose the short answer is that we 
could not help ourselves because what we were talking about mattered to us. This wasn’t 
just a difference of opinion over technical considerations but a struggle over power and 
influence which called into question who we were and what we thought was important: it 
raised questions of power, politics and ethics. Despite the fact that we were both 
experienced academics, neither of us could resist making our different cases as strongly as 
possible and to present our arguments to the good. 
 
Although I want to explore further some of the different intellectual assumptions involved in 
our two positions, it’s worth dwelling on this point, that my colleague and I were caught up 
in the moment despite ourselves, because I think it goes to the heart of my motivation to 
write this book. It might have been a memorable incident, perhaps for the two protagonists, 
and I suspect also for everyone present exposed to the warmth of the encounter, but in 
many ways it was also quite an ordinary, every day experience in organizations. We found 
ourselves engaged in a conflict involving contradictory ways of understanding human 
interaction, which, rather than bringing about greater certainty, might have created greater 
uncertainty amongst those who were present. If they were looking for advice about how to 
proceed with their evaluation, they may well have left the meeting confused. The encounter 
also centred around different conceptions of the good, the role and function of the 
evaluation, as well as questions of method: there is no separating them. It as both an 
argument about the best method to use in a particular evaluation, but it was also a moral 
argument and a discussion about how we think and resolve our problems. 
 
One of the central contentions of this book is that daily life in organizations is far from ideal, 
and involves many such encounters where people try to persuade each other, more or less 
politely, more or less forcefully, of the strength of their position. They co-operate and 
compete to get things done together, they cajole and try to sway each other, frame their 
arguments using rhetoric, become impassioned about what they think is the right thing to 
do, and are generally caught up in the game of organizational life. This is a political and an 
ethical game which involves many conceptions of the good in any particular situation and 
the constant unfolding of paradox. Players of the game are involved together in the task at 
hand while trying to make sense of overall objectives, they try to control while in turn they 
are controlled, they strive to innovate while at the same time struggle to preserve the best 
of what makes their particular organization unique and successful. Sometimes they are lucid 
about how they are getting carried away with the task at hand as they find themselves 
responding to unpredictable contingencies which disrupt their projects and plans. These are 
the contradictions and paradoxes, the situations which seem to confound ‘common sense’, 
that most interest me about working alongside other people in organisations which create 
the environment of uncertainty in organizations. I accept that, to a degree, organizational 
life has speeded up and is more complex because of technological innovation and 
globalisation, but mostly my preoccupation is with the ‘ordinary’ complexity of getting 
things done with other people, which in my view has a lot more to do with being human 
than any special phase we may be going through. In every period of history people have 
thought of themselves as undergoing unprecedented change. 
 
Accepted manuscript. 
Sample chapter from Managing in Uncertainty: Complexity and the paradoxes of everyday organizational life. Routledge, 2015. 
https://www.routledge.com/Managing-in-Uncertainty-Complexity-and-the-paradoxes-of-everyday-organizational/Mowles/p/book/9781138843745
 6 
Of course, if organizational life was not so predictably unpredictable it would probably not 
be so absorbing, but you would be hard pressed to find this hurly-burly reflected in much of 
the management literature1. Instead, as my colleague above was describing, it aspires to 
being rational, scientific and to leave its values at the door. Contradiction, ambiguity and 
value judgements are assumed to get in the way of the work, and therefore must be 
eliminated or ignored. I’m sure that my colleague on the board just thought I was being 
difficult by drawing attention to the paradox in his thinking, that he had strong values about 
not having values.  In most management theory leaders and managers are described as 
being detached, rational observers of the organizations in which they are working who 
choose the futures for them using reason and logic, shape the culture and even select the 
kinds of values that the staff working for them should have. This is assumed to be possible 
using rationality which renders experience a matter of choices between different technical 
options. Equally in apparently more mystifying and contradictory areas of human 
experience, such as paradox, more of which below, leaders and managers are again 
assumed to be able to harness contradictions for the good of the organization and to 
generate creativity, harmony and sustainability.  There is also a substantial minority 
literature on contradiction and paradox which I treat in the next chapter which does accept 
ambiguity as a given. In chapter two I will set out the similarities and differences between 
scholars trying to work with uncertainty and my own position. 
 
The evidence-based management movement and what it excludes 
My colleague on the board was arguing in favour of what is generally accepted as the 
highest scientific methods for evaluating social development, RCTs. There is a similar school 
of thought in management and organization studies, the evidence-based management 
movement, which sets out the case for using more evidence in management decision-
making as well as in the classroom in business schools. The intentions of those supporting 
evidence-based management are honourable in the sense that they seek to place the 
practice of management on a secure and scientific footing, but their arguments also have 
unintended consequences and exclude aspects of experience from consideration, such as 
judgements of value (unless they also consider value judgements to be subject to rational 
discussion). There are also questions as to the extent which general theories of the social 
apply in particular cases, an argument I pursue further in chapter 5. 
 
For example, in an inaugural address, the then president of the Academy of Management, 
Denise Rousseau set out the case for evidence-based management based on medical science 
almost exactly in the same way that my colleague on the board did (Rousseau, 2006). This 
movement is still very strong, but equally has run into a number of difficulties similar to the 
argument which developed in the organisation where I was on the board. Firstly, despite the 
call for practising management and teaching management on the basis of evidence, actually 
there is not very much evidence, particularly not of the most valued kind, from RCTs, as Reay 
et al (2009) discovered in their article entitled “what’s the evidence on evidence-based 
management?’  Secondly, it provoked a response from those scholars writing in a different 
social science tradition (Learmonth, 2006; Learmonth and Harding, 2006, Stacey, 2012) of 
which this book is an example, that what counts as evidence in the social is contested, and 
therefore is likely to produce a paradox: the more evidence is collected, the more 
contestation, so rather than creating greater certainty, the search for evidence may only 
create greater uncertainty and ambiguity, ie multiple meanings with no necessary 
connection between them. Learmonth’s second critique is to point to a second paradox, that 
the claim to being scientific rests on a number of exclusions which are taken as self-evident 
                                                     
1 There are of course some notable exceptions, some of which I explore in this book. 
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and are removed from scientific scrutiny: evidence-based management scholarship often 
takes its assumptions for granted, for example that it is a good thing to aspire to being a 
‘great manager in a great company’ and that we all know and agree what that means.  
Stacey also points out that ‘evidence’ is used in a way which reinforces the dominant 
ideology of managerialism, that contemporary managers and management theory is an 
uncontestable good. In other words, what we take to be the good, questions of ethics and 
how we might live our lives, are considered secondary, if they are considered at all. 
 
Learmonth and Stacey proceed to point out the contradictions in the President of the AoM’s 
argument, and the evidence-based management movement in general, much as I did with 
my colleague on the board. Orthodox management research is often incapable of returning 
to itself and questioning its own assumptions and exclusions. And I am guessing that the 
president of the AoM might have found having this pointed out just as infuriating as did my 
colleague. I might argue, then, that much conventional management theory is incapable of 
paradoxical, reflexive thought, or bending back on itself and questioning its own 
assumptions, thus rendering questions of power, politics and ethics less visible. 
 
It is still the case that scholarship which seeks to enlarge the evidence base for particular 
domains of management still proceed from a taken-for-granted assumption that there is no 
problem with what we are seeking evidence about, or how we collect it, merely whether it is 
implemented or taken up in the classroom. For example, a study by Charlier et al. (2011) 
tries to find out how much evidence-based management is taught on required MBA syllabi 
without setting out any of the arguments exploring what the term might mean, even in 
passing. However and at the same time, it is clear that the argument which has developed 
about what we mean by evidence and how we might gather it has also shifted the ground of 
the debate. For example, Briner and Rousseau (2011) now define evidence as: "making 
decisions through conscientious, explicit, and judicious use of four sources of information: 
practitioner expertise and judgment, evidence from the local context, a critical evaluation of 
the best available research evidence, and the perspective of people who might be affected 
by the decision". If this is now taken to be measure of good evidence, asking people what 
they think, taking account of the context, asking the people who will be affected and reading 
a bit, then it is hard to know what the evidence-based management movement is offering 
that is beyond what most managers and educators would probably be doing anyway. 
 
Later on, in chapter 5 on change and innovation in organizational life, I will extend the 
argument about some of the difficulties of making predictions in social life by drawing on the 
moral philosopher Alisdair MacIntyre (1981). What is interesting in MacIntyre’s position is 
that he was always trying to reintroduce the notion of virtue and conceptions of the good, 
drawing on Aristotle, into our understanding of social practices. This is a philosophical 
rendering of some of the insights from the complexity sciences which I explore later on in 
this chapter. I am not making a claim that statistical approaches, logic and rationality are 
irrelevant to managing: they can afford helpful insights into large-scale phenomena and 
generate helpful ideas to pursue further. I am suggesting they are necessary but insufficient 
to understand the detail of how people make work work, and am pointing to the idea that 
they may not tell us all we need to know better to organize together. As Bourdieu observed 
(1990), the logic of logic is not the logic of practice. 
 
 
Paradox and other forms of dualism 
As an alternative to looking for evidence of ‘what works’, this book seeks to take uncertainty 
seriously to note how it produces uncertain, contradictory and paradoxical conditions for 
managers. By exploring uncertainty and the political and ethical questions which it raises, 
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the book tries to uncover insights about management and leadership to see how possible it 
is to generalise from them, but not in the sense of recommending ‘best practice’ or coming 
to a final view. Contradictions arise partly as a result of exploring one point of view, and then 
another, a process of dialectic which I will explain further below, but which I hope has been 
demonstrated both with my narrative at the beginning of the chapter and with the 
controversy surrounding what we might take evidence-based management to mean. One 
point of view calls out an alternative, perhaps opposite point of view, which in turn calls out 
a modified version of the first. There is a back and forth dialectic which demonstrates a 
movement in thinking and generates more than one perspective: there is never just one 
best way. The kind of generalizability that I am looking for is not necessarily one which can 
be proved one way or another, but which triggers recognition in the reader, and perhaps 
rich resonances with their own experience, and opens up other lines of inquiry and richer 
perspectives. Of course, this approach is not scientific in the strict sense of the word, but 
that does not prevent my approach from being systematic and from testing arguments as 
rigorously as possible. It is a way of arguing which seeks to establish whether an intellectual 
position is warranted, in John Dewey’s terms (1941), and draws on a long Socratic tradition 
of arguing in public. But there is no requirement to come to a final resting place, with an 
agreement about what truth is. 
 
But first, I will set out more clearly what I understand paradox, a particular kind of 
contradiction, to be, since it figures so prominently in the writing of many of the writers I 
bring into this book. It is simply our ability to think the opposite of what we are currently 
thinking, for the mind to overreach itself in thinking, which produces an absurdity, 
something which is para doxa, or against common sense. There are two, mutually exclusive, 
self-referencing ideas which help define each other but negate each other both at the same 
time.  To give an example, one of the earliest and most famous examples of semantic 
paradox is the so-called Cretan, or Liar’s paradox attributed to the Cretan poet Epimenides, 
who claimed that ‘all Cretans are liars’, a true/false paradox.  Whichever conclusion we 
come to about this statement leaves us with a problem. If the statement is true, then 
Epimenides, a Cretan, is lying and the statement is false. If the statement is false, that not all 
Cretans are liars, then Epimenides must by lying, which makes the statement true. The 
statement is unresolvable because one conclusion immediately leads you to its opposite. 
Each solution immediately produces a contradictory response which is against common 
sense. This can be maddening, and it can also be helpful. In its maddening form it can 
produce thinking or behaviour, which loops back on itself and becomes stuck, endlessly 
repeating between the two poles: this is known as a vicious paradox, like this first example. 
Or it might be generative, allowing the exploration of a particular area of human experience 
in more than one dimension, and it is the second of these which I hope to further in this 
book. 
 
Dualistic tension manifests itself in a variety of different forms in human thought. First of all 
there is the simple dilemma between two choices which present themselves, both of which 
have criteria for and against. Dilemmas appear quite a lot in organizational theory and are 
sometimes represented, unhelpfully in my view, as paradoxes. The most prominent example 
of this, which is repeated again and again in organizational literature, is March’s distinction 
(1991) between the options for companies to explore further developments, or to exploit 
the developments they have already made, the so-called explore-exploit paradox. These two 
options are not mutually referential, nor do they necessarily negate each other: they simply 
describe an opportunity dilemma for managers. 
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Next, a double bind has many of the characteristics of a vicious paradox, and creates a 
negative spiral.  As an example, take the U2 song, ‘(I can’t live) with or without you’, or the 
famous joke about an overbearing mother who gives her son two ties and when he puts one 
on to show her, she asks him what is wrong with the other one. Here the tension produces 
two negative mutually exclusive alternatives, a rock and a hard place. Bateson (1970), who 
did a lot of work on double binds in his exploration of schizophrenia, argues that there is a 
third negative condition of a double bind, which produces distress and anxiety in those 
experiencing it. There is no escape from it: a person is forced to chose between one negative 
alternative and another, neither of which resolves the situation (as in the U2 song) and the 
injunction to choose one or the other takes away all sense of freedom. Bateson was heavily 
influenced by cybernetic systems theory and made reference to Russell’s Theory of Logical 
Types (1908) to explain his idea of double bind. For him it was a confusion between logical 
levels of abstraction and a binding injunction to the person experiencing the double bind not 
to adopt a meta-position, to abstract further from their experience to yet a different level of 
logic. 
 
In this book I am not assuming that paradox is a property of a system, or that it occurs at 
different levels of logic, although I will briefly explore the ideas of some scholars (Luhmann, 
1995) who think it is in the next chapter. However, I am confident that many people working 
in organizations will have experienced double binds. These might arise in organizations 
undergoing ‘culture change’ programmes for example where staff are invited to believe in 
the organizational vision and align with company values on the one hand (and sometimes 
the extent to which they are following the company values will be measured), and on the 
other hand they will be invited to be their authentic selves, to speak out and be honest. So, 
first there is an injunction to staff to believe in a set of value statements and be judged 
whether they are conforming or not and thus give up their freedom; and at the same time 
they are told to be themselves and be authentic (but if they do they may contradict the 
company values). Staff are obliged to choose, but neither of the choices are good ones. 
 
Additionally in terms of dualistic thought, there is irony, for which the English are supposed 
to be famed. This arises as a result of the confounding of expectations, either verbally, or in 
a particular situation. For example dramatic irony occurs where a theatre audience is given 
greater insight into the unfolding of a plot than the central characters. In Romeo and Juliet 
the poignancy of the plot is that we can see how their plans will cost their lives although 
they are unaware of this. And in rhetoric there is chiasm, which is an arresting figure of 
speech such as President Kennedy’s ‘ask not what your country can do for you, but what you 
can do for your country’, where the meaning is inverted in parallel clauses. 
 
I hope to be relatively disciplined when talking about paradox in the strict sense in this book, 
differentiating it from double bind, dilemma, irony, chiasm and simple contradiction, 
although I do not intend to be pedantic. Cleaving to some sense of what a paradox is and 
why it is important may present opportunities for thinking about the complexity of 
organizational life. And when other scholars use the term it will afford the opportunity to 
think about what they mean by it, and therefore to make some distinctions bearing in mind 
the pragmatic dictum that differences make a difference. 
 
Paradox in logic, literature and philosophy 
Paradox has a rich history and has been explored over the centuries in the domains of logic, 
literature and philosophy. As I mentioned above, for natural scientists contradiction in logic 
is something to be avoided since it is evidence of weak thinking: so in Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics (1998) he claimed that it is impossible for two opposing propositions to be true 
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at the same time: “The most certain of all basic principles is that contradictory propositions 
are not true simultaneously" (1011b13-14). However, this is far from saying that he was 
uninterested in oppositions, such as the one and the many, infinity and finitude, which 
pervades the Metaphysics and which he inherited from Plato via Parmenides. In natural 
science and mathematics practitioners have clung to this basic standpoint, as did my 
colleague on the board of the not-for-profit, with spectacular results in predicting and 
controlling the natural world. However, mathematical logic has never quite done away with 
paradox as I will show in the penultimate chapter of this book, but demonstrably so 
following the work of the Austrian mathematician Gödel at the beginning of the 20th 
century, who was intrigued by the attempt of Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead 
to develop a mathematical system which was devoid of contradiction in number theory. In 
order to prove this Russell and Whitehead’s system would need to be both consistent and 
complete. With a series of elaborate proofs, and similar to the Liar’s Paradox, Gödel 
produced two incompleteness theorems, demonstrating that no mathematical system could 
be either complete or consistent by reference to itself. Gödel’s theorems are extensively 
explored in Douglas Hofstadter’s work (1979, 2008), where he argues that consciousness is 
an automatic property of sufficiently complex systems, which produce mechanical, recursive 
self-reference, the ‘strange loop’ in the title of his most recent book. In other words, he 
makes few distinctions between consciousness, mind and self, which I will unpick further 
below drawing on Mead (1934), and is satisfied instead with a material and mechanical 
explanation of consciousness, a reverberating loopiness of the brain as complex system.  
 
Paradox abounds in literature, too, and Linda Colie (1966) has written extensively about how 
paradox flourished in the Renaissance, particularly in the work of Shakespeare. Shakespeare 
brings together contradictions to confound expectations, just as his characters pretend to be 
other than they are and women leads play men, characters presumed dead are in fact alive, 
and nothing is quite what it seems. What this makes possible is a variety of surprising 
perspectives on love, truth, gender and power. However, in literature paradoxes are 
deployed to provoke, to complexify and to add aesthetic appeal but in no sense are they 
intended to develop an argument, as they are in philosophy, where they are deployed to 
explore an idea from different perspectives. 
 
In this book I write about paradoxes in the natural sciences and mathematics in chapter 7 
and in the sciences of complexity below in this chapter, but for the most part I am 
concerned neither with logical nor literary paradoxes but with philosophical paradoxes. I will 
be sticking closely to what Kainz (1988: 43-44) argues are the properties of a philosophical 
paradox, which are four. First, we take paradox seriously, the unity-in-distinction which 
ordinary speech and logic would not allow. Second we consider the paradoxes as far as 
possible which are non-vicious, unlike the double binds explained above or the semantic 
paradoxes like the Liar’s paradox, as a way of coming to understand a phenomenon in a 
richer and more dynamic way than just treating it as a case of static polar opposites. The 
third characteristic is that the setting in motion of opposites creates the potential for 
intellectual transcendence, the movement of thinking which parallels the dynamic of 
paradox.  I discuss the paradox of consciousness below, and in chapter 3, when exploring 
reflection and reflexivity which, I argue, is the root of the movement of thought. And lastly, a 
paradox needs to be able to sustain an argument and be demonstrated: that is to say that it 
is not dependent on belief or aesthetic intuition.  
 
The link I am making to organizational research and management is that instead of excluding 
what might be of most use and perhaps greatest interest to practicing managers and 
leaders, the often ambiguous, contradictory and paradoxical tensions in human and 
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organizational life which call out political and ethical questions, this book will try to explore 
them more fully as a means of bringing about some kind of complex order. This exploration 
comes with a caveat though: I have no intention of moving towards any kind of final 
resolution of the contradictions I will be investigating because I am assuming that there is no 
meta-position to adopt in relation to them (although the process may fulfil Kainz’s third 
criterion, that of provoking the reader into a dynamic movement of thinking), nor is there 
any final resting place. However, I will try to sum up what I think some of the important 
observations are for managers and leaders. But this is a different method from that adopted 
by the majority literature on organization and management and I anticipate that it may be 
frustrating to some readers of this book more used to being given prescriptions for what to 
do. There will be no attempt at ‘deparadoxification’ in Luhmann’s terms (1995), or to 
‘harness paradox’ for greater organizational effectiveness, or to ‘unleash’ the creative forces 
of paradox, or even to take up paradox as a ‘lens’ if what is meant by this that human beings 
can somehow choose to ‘leverage’ paradox as perspective. I am much less interested in 
tightly formulating ‘what works’ since from my perspective, what works depends on who is 
involved, the context, the history and the relationships of power. 
 
Just as Kainz recommends, I will set out an argument and it will proceed dialectically, which 
is to say exploring a position, then a counter position, then as a direct result of this, 
exploring the first position further. Whatever insight we gain from this way of theorising is in 
the back and forth between one position and another, much as my board colleague and I 
engaged with each other in the narrative above. Setting out an argument brings out a 
counter argument, which in turn elicits another, which also points to different ethical claims. 
As Kainz (1988) explains, dialectical argument dates back to ancient Greek philosophy, and 
has itself developed and evolved from what he considers the original form of dialectic in 
Socrates, which takes place in living conversation in ordinary language, through Platonic and 
Aristotelian dialectic. The method in this book bears close resemblance to the last of these, 
where there is an attempt to sift the arguments for and against some contentious topic, or 
my aim would be to make it more contentious than it currently is, as a way of investigating 
the theme more in the round and more systematically. The intention is not to resolve the 
topic, but to make it more complex: there is, then, something of a trade-off between trying 
to explore a theme in the round and consistent, conventionally logical argument leading to a 
conclusion. The other influence on my argument in this book is Hegel, who most consistently 
developed the idea of both dialectic and paradox which I will explore in the next chapter, 
but first I want to explore paradox in the sciences of complexity and make a link between 
these and the social sciences as I develop my argument. 
 
The link between the complexity sciences and paradox 
For more than 20 years a group of academics at the University of Hertfordshire has been 
developing ideas derived from the complexity sciences (Stacey, Griffin and Shaw, 2000; 
Stacey, 2010; Mowles, 2011; Stacey, 2011; Stacey, 2012) using them as a source domain for 
thinking about life in organizations. From a perspective they call complex responsive 
processes of relating the Complexity and Management Group at Hertfordshire takes an 
interest in flux and change in organisational life, how it can demonstrate both stability and 
instability both at the same time. In doing so colleagues put people and what they are doing 
at work at the heart of their enquiry: how they talk to one another, how they are bound by 
relationships of power, how they make value judgements which express ideology. This 
perspective derives insights from the complexity sciences and makes arguments by analogy, 
linking them with similar ideas from the social sciences. It takes a particular interest in 
uncertainty, contradiction and paradox, for the reasons I will now explain. 
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Why turn to the complexity sciences for theories about organizational life? The complexity 
sciences have manifestations in biology, meteorology, neurology, zoology and computer 
science, usually in the form of computer-based mathematical models, to simulate, say, ant 
colonies, or the working of the human brain. These models are useful for looking at 
phenomena which are in constant flux and change and where there are complex 
interdependencies between different entities or actors. One of the things my colleagues at 
Hertfordshire have found interesting about complexity models is that they operate using 
non-linear equations which have no solution, but rather are useful for showing emerging 
patterns and calculating probability. Meteorologists, for example, will run a model of an 
evolving weather pattern, which has variables such as barometric pressure, wind speed, 
humidity, many thousands of times to calculate the probability of a particular weather 
pattern emerging.  That is to say, and in contrast to the way my colleague on the board was 
arguing in our heated discussion, in a non-linear model there is no necessary proportionality 
between a cause and an effect, nor is it possible amongst the interdependent variables 
which cause had which effect. A specified input may not bring about a predicted change in 
the way that is assumed in an RCT experiment, for example. A small intervention may bring 
about a big effect (popularly understood as the butterfly effect) and a large intervention 
may bring about no change at all. And in the large number of complex interrelationships it is 
not possible to isolate and identify exactly which cause led to which effect. So in an evolving 
weather pattern a slight change in wind speed or the Jet Stream may increase the likelihood 
of rain falling. An additional characteristic of non-linear mathematical models is that they do 
not move towards an equilibrium state, a solution in mathematical terms. Instead the 
output from one iteration of an equation is entered as an input to the next. The models 
show qualitative changes in patterning over time, iterating then reiterating.  
 
Here are two examples where non-linear mathematical models demonstrate paradoxical 
properties. In models of mathematical chaos, and at certain parameters, a graphed output 
will show a pattern of regular irregularity: that is to say, it is neither completely chaotic with 
no pattern at all, nor does it fluctuate in a predictable way between one point and another. 
A pattern emerges which is neither completely stable, nor completely unstable, but stable 
and unstable both at the same time. Those readers of a particular age may remember 
computer screen savers, in the days when there were such things, which were based on 
fractals, or Mandelbrot sets. The screensaver patterns, named after the mathematician 
Benoit Mandelbrot, would develop of a highly complex kind, both regular and irregular at 
the same time and repeating similarly at any degree of scale. This is a phenomenon which 
can be observed very clearly in nature, in, say, the patterning of coastlines, or ferns, or every 
tree, which is symmetrically unsymmetrical.  
 
As second example of a paradoxical property in the non-linear sciences of complexity can be 
found in complex adaptive systems models. The models are intended to simulate how order 
and disorder arise within a population of, say, ants or termites, or the synapses in a human 
brain; in each of these examples there is no obvious control centre, and the coherence of 
the whole population arises from the micro-activity of each of the individual agents 
interacting locally with other, similar agents. The analytical sociologist Peter Hedström 
(2005) has used complex adaptive systems models to simulate patterns of work-seeking and 
peer influence in unemployed young people in Stockholm. So complex adaptive systems 
models contain populations of interacting agents, bit strings of code, which interact with 
neighbouring agents according to rules set by the programmer. If the interacting agents are 
the same, then a regularly irregular pattern will emerge such as flocking behaviour 
(Reynolds, 1987), exactly like the roosting behaviour of flocks of starlings, for example. If the 
agents are diverse, then diverse and changing patterns can emerge across the whole 
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population of agents which are surprising and novel. The model demonstrates evolutionary 
development precisely and only because of the activity of the interacting agents. One 
paradox is that the local interaction of the agents produces the population-wide pattern, but 
at the same time the population-wide pattern imposes constraints on exactly how the 
agents can interact. Stacey (2012) has a much more extensive account of how these 
evolutionary models demonstrate the paradox of local agents forming a global pattern, yet 
being formed by it both at the same time. 
 
Just to reiterate, then, to emphasize why the sciences of complexity might be of interest to 
anyone wanting to understand the complexity of organizational life: computer models 
developed by scientists working with non-linear equations and with multi-agent models are 
unpredictable over the long term and demonstrate paradoxical properties. They are 
paradoxically stable and unstable both at the same time (neither completely chaotic, nor 
completely symmetrically patterned), and are therefore predictably unpredictable. Complex 
adaptive systems models evolve through the local interactions of the population of agents to 
produce changing patterns, but at the same time it those evolving patterns which constrain 
exactly how the local agents will interact with each other: the agents form the pattern and 
are formed by it both at the same time.  
 
Complexity in the social 
My colleagues at the university of Hertfordshire turn to the social sciences to try to 
understand what these insights from the non-linear sciences might mean in social terms. 
After all, it would be very reductive to think of ourselves as agents in a computer model, or 
as operating according to algorithms written by someone else. My colleagues feel that the 
sciences of complexity might have something very useful to say about what is known in 
sociology as the structure/agency debate, and about action, and stability and change in 
society. In other words, how we might account for the fact that social life appears to be 
ordered and structured, very much constraining how we can act and think, and yet at the 
same time we can act relatively autonomously, have aspirations, make decisions, dream 
dreams. A number of social psychologists and sociologists have taken a view on what links 
the apparent ‘structure’ of society with individual activity, including George Herbert Mead 
(1934) (and other philosophers in the pragmatic tradition), who argued that society arises in 
the activity of highly social selves; Pierre Bourdieu (1977, 1982, 1990), who pointed to the 
habitus, an inherited bodily disposition to act in a particular way because the body is in the 
social world, but the social world is also in the body; and Norbert Elias (1978, 1991, 
1939/2000) who argued that the individual and the social are two sides of the same coin – 
there is no I without we. We become a self only because there are other selves. The I in the 
we always provokes all kinds of ethical dilemmas. 
 
With these three scholars in particular one of the things to notice is the way they deploy 
paradox, mostly without drawing attention to the fact, to convey the complex recursivity of 
our thinking about complex experience and the stable instability of social life and its moral 
complexity. For these in particular, and for other philosophers sociologists and organization 
scholars I adduce in the book, there is no one way of describing the complex flux of social 
interaction. It is best understood from a perspective which does as much justice as possible 
to the complexity of the phenomenon it is trying to describe. Where might we begin in our 
enquiry about social complexity? 
 
The paradox of consciousness: reconciling dualisms. 
Perhaps the most complex question of all is how we become conscious and come to know 
the world, and the discussion has a long history in philosophy. During the Enlightenment 
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there was an enormous flourishing of optimism that human beings could come to know 
themselves and the world through the use of reason and the development of the scientific 
method. The rational, calculating, objectifying methods of scientific enquiry involved 
producing a dualism between the thinking subject and the object of thought.  The starkest 
expression of this split is Descartes’ idea that the only thing we can be confident about is 
that we think: Descartes even doubted that he had a body. His assumption was that the 
thinking mind gives human beings their freest form as self-defining subjects. Nature, then, is 
to be doubted, and is no more than a mechanical apparatus to be dissected and studied at a 
distance by the thinking self. While dissatisfied with Descartes’ and Newton’s mechanical 
universe, discoverable from universal laws, Kant nonetheless perpetuated the same dualism, 
which he termed an antimony, by arguing that we can come to know phenomena, 
appearances, but we can never get to know ‘things in themselves’. The search for truth is to 
try to get closer and closer to ‘things in themselves’, but which will always elude us. Reality 
was counterposed against the knowing subject: two poles of an antimony but which can 
never be reconciled.  
 
Taylor (1979) notes how the rise of the Enlightenment also provoked a counter movement 
of thought in Romanticism, which was a reaction against the perceived instrumentalization 
and objectification of Nature. The rise of the Enlightenment was perceived to have stripped 
human kind of their spiritual home in Nature. Taylor points out that Hegel felt impelled to 
work with these two counter movements of his age, to cleave to the promise of reason on 
the one hand, but to maintain human beings’ place in an organic and purposive Nature on 
the other.  He developed an enormous body of work, which he referred to as a philosophical 
system, trying to work with dualisms which he considered unnecessarily separated out in 
Enlightenment thinking, such as for example, the split between the knowing subject and 
what can be known; the thinking mind and the body; the finite nature of Man and an infinite 
God. To do so Hegel deployed paradox extensively in an attempt to delineate and maintain 
countervailing forces. 
 
In the Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel developed the insight from the work of Fichte that 
consciousness arises from our ability to be both the subject and object of our own thinking. 
We might think of this as the primary paradox from which all other paradoxes flow: 
 
I distinguish myself from myself, and in doing so I am directly aware that what is 
distinguished from myself is not different [from me]. I, the selfsame being, repel 
myself from myself; but what is posited as distinct from me, or as unlike me, is 
immediately, in being so distinguished, not a distinction for me. It is true that 
consciousness of an ‘other’, of an object in general, is itself necessarily self-
consciousness, a reflectedness-into-self, consciousness of itself in its otherness. 
Hegel (1807/1977, Para 164: 102)  
 
We can both think, and think about ourselves thinking, that is, we can be both reflective and 
reflexive. Instead of separating the thinking self from what is thought about, Hegel includes 
the thinking self in the movement of thought, in the back and forth between subject and 
object. From this base of the paradox of consciousness Hegel’s project was an attempt 
systematically to engage with the dualisms which develop in human thinking and to keep 
them in motion, in paradoxical relation, through dialectic. Who knows and what is known 
are part of the same movement of thought as we learn to reconcile the contradictions which 
are constantly presenting themselves in our thought.  But Hegel argued that the 
reconciliation occurs not through a cancelling out, but through the preservation of the 
contradiction in a higher order, a higher unity, which in turn provokes another contradiction. 
Accepted manuscript. 
Sample chapter from Managing in Uncertainty: Complexity and the paradoxes of everyday organizational life. Routledge, 2015. 
https://www.routledge.com/Managing-in-Uncertainty-Complexity-and-the-paradoxes-of-everyday-organizational/Mowles/p/book/9781138843745
 15 
Hegel’s term for this is Aufhebung, the unity in difference, and in my understanding this is an 
evolutionary theory which Hegel applies to all things including the development of human 
society. The constant contradiction, reconciliation which preserves the contradiction, then a 
new contradiction develops higher and higher forms. I will explore these ideas again in a bit 
more depth in the next chapter, but it is exactly this back and forth of thought which I make 
the basis of this book and my explorations of organizational life. 
 
It might be tempting to conclude that the theorising of dead white philosophers has little to 
do with what managers have to do in the day to day. But Hegel’s philosophy has been 
enormously influential on many of the thinkers brought into this book, such as Mead, Dewey 
Elias and Bourdieu and more generally on Marx and his inheritors. Both Elias and Marx, for 
example, draw heavily on Hegel’s insight that societies progress from lower to higher orders 
of complexity through struggle, opposition and inner contradiction, although Marx mostly 
confined his analysis to struggle in the economic sphere. And to a large extent the argument 
Hegel is working through, what the relationship is between knower and known, is still 
relevant today and shows up in the dispute between my colleague on the board and me. My 
colleague is convinced that the highest form of knowledge is to choose one pole of the 
dualism between the researcher and the object of research, even to the extent of denying, 
after Descartes, that he has a human presence apart from his thinking. What is in question is 
the extent to which human relations can be objectified, what gets lost in the objectification 
process, and what alternative ways of knowing might be. 
 
It is impossible to form theories about what happens in organizational life without coming 
down somewhere in the debate about how we can know what is going on there, and how 
we might form theories about it. In this book I am trying to work with a dialectical 
understanding of organizational life which puts paradox at the heart of the enquiry, and 
keeps the researcher and the researched together. I am trying to bring together theory and 
practice, certainty and uncertainty, stability and change. 
 
The paradoxes of mind, self and society 
Mead developed Hegel’s insight about consciousness in psycho-anthropological terms. In 
Mead’s work what distinguishes us from other animals is our ability to take the attitudes of 
other people, what he termed the ‘generalized other’, to ourselves. In other words, because 
we are capable of seeing ourselves as others see us, a peculiar property of our central 
nervous system, we are able to take ourselves as objects to ourselves. This is what Mead 
termed the I/me dialectic: the mutually constitutive, mutually negating dynamic of 
individual and social. We might think of this as a double paradox: we are subjects to other 
people, who are our objects, but we are also objects to ourselves because we can take their 
perspective on us. Rooted in Hegel’s insights, Mead argues that we become selves 
intersubjectively. I think what Hegel and Mead are pointing to here is the constant 
movement of the mind as social phenomenon, where we can hold onto ourselves as not-
ourselves in relation to other minds, which turns on paradox. Indeed, we can go further as 
the German sociologist Axel Honneth does (1995) to say that we wouldn’t become ourselves 
without the struggle of recognition with and through others: we recognise ourselves 
through the recognition of others. Consciousness is a social phenomenon which requires 
other conscious beings and involves a struggle over negation, and negation of that negation 
to establish evolving social norms. 
 
If we were to draw on psychoanalytic theory, however, we would understand the 
subject/object split not as something that we are born with, however, but as something 
Accepted manuscript. 
Sample chapter from Managing in Uncertainty: Complexity and the paradoxes of everyday organizational life. Routledge, 2015. 
https://www.routledge.com/Managing-in-Uncertainty-Complexity-and-the-paradoxes-of-everyday-organizational/Mowles/p/book/9781138843745
 16 
which develops over the first few months of our lives2. As infants we experience no 
separation between our mothers and us. But without the growing realisation of 
separateness, that the mother is a distinct being, and that she who provides food and 
comfort can also withhold it, we would not be able to go on to make the other distinctions 
we do. The growing ability to make distinctions between what is us and not-us develops in 
the developing infant but has also evolved through the ages, according to both Norbert Elias 
(2000) and the Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor (1992) and experienced a full and 
conscious flourishing during the Enlightenment. In previous centuries we made much less of 
a distinction between natural phenomena and our feelings about them: our growing ability 
to separate ourselves from the phenomena we wanted to understand has led to a much 
greater degree of control. If we could not tell the difference between us and not-us, then 
science, which relies on this demand for separateness from the objects of study, would not 
be possible. But perhaps there is an argument that the evolution of, and aspiration for, 
objectivity about social phenomena has a tendency to exclude the very phenomena which 
may be illuminating for us about ourselves. This was Hegel’s project, along with the 
pragmatist school of philosophy (Peirce, James, Mead, Dewey, Bernstein, Rorty). This book, 
by focusing on reflection and reflexivity, is a small attempt to bring managers and what they 
are thinking and feeling back into to the discussion about what happens in organizational life 
with an assumption that our understanding is enriched as a consequence. 
 
The means of keeping subject and object in relation is the back and forth exchange of what 
Mead terms significant symbols. A symbol is significant if it has a similar meaning for 
someone communicating with it, as for the person being communicated with. When we 
converse with others, we gesture towards them with significant symbols which call out in 
ourselves the response we anticipate calling out in them: the paradox of gesturing to 
ourselves as an object, of recognising the self in the recognition of others, enables mind, a 
sense of self and thus a society of conscious selves to arise. The gesture calls out a dual and 
mutual anticipation between ourselves and others. Mead argues that social life would be 
impossible without this mutually anticipatory gesture and response, which allows us 
constantly to adjust to each other in the contexts we find ourselves, and the particular 
people we are dealing with. So from the primary paradox of consciousness a number of 
other paradoxes arise, for example that the process of individualization is a social process. 
We become a self because there are other selves. Equally, thinking is the internalization of a 
social process of gesture and response directed by the body towards itself.  The clear 
demarcation between what happens ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ ourselves as human beings breaks 
down because we are social even in our private thought processes. 
 
The mutual and paradoxical formation of the individual and society was also a core theme 
for Elias (1991), who put forward the idea that changes in our psychological make-up are 
reflected in structural changes in society and vice-versa. The one brings out the other: 
 
One finds then – in adopting a wider, dynamic viewpoint instead of a static one – 
that the vision of an irreducible wall between one human being and all others, 
between inner and outer worlds, evaporates to be replaced by a vision of an 
incessant and irreducible intertwining of individual beings, in which everything that 
gives their animal substance the quality of a human being, primarily their psychical 
self-control, their individual character, takes on specific shape in and through 
relationships to others. (1991: 32) 
 
                                                     
2 For example, Melanie Klein (1975) drew on Freud to argue that the infant learns to cope with the 
world by ‘splitting’ good and bad objects. 
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Previously I mentioned the complexity sciences where interacting agents in a complex 
adaptive system form and are formed by the population of which they are part: Elias offers 
us the sociological equivalent. We form, and are formed by, the social. The paradoxes of 
individual and social, inclusion in groups and exclusion from them are generated by our 
interdependencies with others, the fluctuating relationships of power, which enable and 
constrain how we behave. As I mentioned earlier, Elias never explicitly mentioned his use of 
paradox, but his writing is infused with them. I explore Elias’ ideas more thoroughly in the 
rest of the book. 
 
Summing up  
Paradox arises from a contradictory tension of thinking and I have been arguing in this 
introductory chapter that organizational life is filled with such tensions which break out all 
the time, sometimes provoking conflict over different ideas of the good. I gave an example 
from my own experience. As human beings we have been aware of the contradictions in the 
way we think about the world for a very long time. But I have made the case that many 
contemporary researchers try to design them away when they study social phenomena, 
based on assumptions derived from the natural sciences that a contradiction, a flaw in logic, 
impedes good research, and that scientific methods have little to say about what we take to 
be the good. Instead, they may argue that there are indeed contradictions in organisational 
life, but the controlling leader or manager can choose one pole of the contradiction over the 
other. I have been making an alternative case, drawing on the complexity sciences and 
sociologists and philosophers interested in complex, contradictory phenomena, that there 
are good reasons for exploring them, which I intend to do in the rest of this book. This will 
involve looking at what I have termed the primary paradox of consciousness and self-
consciousness and everything that seems to me to flow from this, in terms of the social 
process of how our actions and intentions form our societies, which in turn form us both at 
the same time. 
 
Organizational uncertainty, ambiguity and paradox – outline of this book 
 
In chapter 2 I return to Hegel, whom I mentioned in the first chapter, to explain briefly how 
his philosophical system is a radical rendering of contradiction and paradox. I explain further 
how his insights have been developed by pragmatic philosophy in particular to justify the 
position that I take up in this book that there is no ‘god’s eye view’ to take up on paradox: it 
can only be understood from within the paradox itself. I give a brief overview of two other 
perspectives on paradox, functionalist sociology and psychology and psychoanalysis.  Both 
have a tendency to render paradox in abstract and systemic terms and to imply that it is 
possible to take a meta-level view. 
 
I then look briefly at the way that other writers on organizations take up paradoxes and 
work with them. In general I conclude that most organizational researchers adopt the 
position that managers and leaders can harness paradox for the good of the organization or 
can somehow instrumentalize it. The reason for taking issue with their position is that it puts 
managers and leaders back in control and assumes uncertainty away. I argue that staying 
with the unsettling nature of uncertainty offers no guarantee of success, but may be more 
realistic than traditions of research which claim to be realist. 
 
Chapter 3 explores the paradox of consciousness and self-consciousness which I described 
earlier on as being the primary paradox. I do this by way of reflecting on our ability to take 
the perspective of the airman and the swimmer, Norbert Elias’ phrase from his book The 
Society of Individuals. Managers are obliged to think about longer term trends but are also 
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caught up in the moment of every day contingencies: they are caught in the paradox of 
involvement and detachment. The chapter considers in detail some of the arguments 
developed in one thread of the leadership literature: so-called ‘entrepreneurial leadership’. I 
discuss whether the term has any merit and try to locate it within the broader discourse 
about leadership.  
 
The chapter then turns to a discussion of reflection and reflexivity and their importance for 
leading and managing, although concludes that reflexivity is no panacea. Reflection and 
reflexivity are not tools or techniques to be taught, but can be cultivated and managers 
made more skilful in their use. Thinking about what is going on, and thinking about how we 
are thinking about what is going on are not recipes for success, however, and it involves 
exercising our moral judgement. For Hannah Arendt, whom I quote in this chapter, it is our 
moral judgements that most make us human. 
 
 
Chapter 4 The next step in my argument is to explore the idea of culture, which emerges 
through the interaction of conscious and self-conscious human beings, those social 
processes which we form, but which form us at the same time. In particular I write about 
organizational culture, if such a thing could be thought to exist separate from both particular 
and  broader social processes. I raise the question about how much leaders and managers 
can manipulate culture in the way claimed by more orthodox management texts, and what 
it means for our freedom if they can. Control of culture is a big prize in organizational 
discourse, but what does it really mean for the practice of management and how possible is 
it to change how people think and feel, rather than just how they behave? 
 
I discuss the perspectives of some prominent organizational theorists on culture, and then 
compare and contrast these with the work of process sociologist Norbert Elias, who argues 
that culture arises in shared collective and symbolic identification. I then go on to discuss 
culture from the perspective of practice, as habituated and context-specific action informed 
by tradition, drawing on Alasdair MacIntyre, Gadamer and contemporary Aristotelian 
philosopher Eikeland. All three philosophers are interested in the immanence of ethics in 
everyday conversational life. 
 
Finally there is an extended discussion of the National Health Service in the UK which has 
been an organization at the heart of contestation and struggle over the perceived need to 
change culture to see what it can tell us about the practice of management and what we 
consider to be the good. 
 
Chapter 5 develops the idea of organisational culture and argues that organisations are both 
stable and unstable at the same time and investigates what this might mean for the 
ubiquitous contemporary narrative about innovation. To what extent can we plan to be 
innovative? I discuss some of the difficulties of the innovation agenda. Firstly, the idea that 
we can plan to be innovative contains an irony, and secondly the majority discourse contains 
a false binary, promoting the idea that innovation is always good and stability is inhibiting. 
Even cursory reflection on, say, the development of complex financial instruments at the 
start of the 21st C will demonstrate that innovations can be both creative and terribly 
destructive. I go on to argue in this chapter that organizations are always sites of paradox 
where both stability and change arise at the same time. 
 
I discuss why social science is unlikely ever to have the predictive power of the natural 
sciences by drawing again on the moral philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre. Generalizations in 
Accepted manuscript. 
Sample chapter from Managing in Uncertainty: Complexity and the paradoxes of everyday organizational life. Routledge, 2015. 
https://www.routledge.com/Managing-in-Uncertainty-Complexity-and-the-paradoxes-of-everyday-organizational/Mowles/p/book/9781138843745
 19 
the social sciences, like management, will always be phrased as holding ‘in general, and for 
the most part’. 
 
The chapter concludes by drawing on some organizational literature in the process school, 
which still leans towards suggesting that managers can design innovation processes. 
 
Chapter 6 is a further exploration of what we might think of as culture and turns on an 
investigation into the paradox of conflict and co-operation and argues that they are two 
sides of the same coin. Despite much contemporary management literature assuming that 
conflict can be managed for the good, I explore whether this is really possible, and what the 
paradox of conflict and co-operation might mean for the emergence of the novel. There are 
clear links to the chapter on innovation, because the argument I set out here is the 
innovation is occurring everyday in both small and large ways, and that this arises from the 
exploration of difference through conflict, large or small. 
 
The chapter discusses the way that conflict is explored in organizational literature, then puts 
forward alternatives from sociological and psychoanalytic literature. The chapter concludes 
that there is no way of avoiding conflict in organizations and nowhere for managers to stand 
which is a neutral position. Managers can only engage with the necessary contestation  
 
Chapter 7 is a brief review of the way that paradox, ambiguity and contradiction are still vital 
to the methods employed in the natural sciences. In the introductory chapter I have 
mentioned that a more naïve view of the exact sciences is that they exclude contradiction. 
Here I try to demonstrate that even the natural sciences thrive on ambiguity and sometimes 
even on paradox. Examples are taken from the domains of mathematics, physics and 
neuroscience. 
 
The point of the chapter is the social sciences, including management, do not need to suffer 
from physics-envy, since even natural scientists develop their work drawing on the mind’s 
ability to veer round to its opposite. 
 
Chapter 8  is a concluding chapter and tries to bring some of the threads of the book 
together setting out the implications for the management of organizations. These are that 
ambiguity, contradiction and paradox, are pervasive in organizational life and cannot be 
wished or managed away. This is not to imply that there is nothing for managers to do, 
however.  The chapter dwells on the importance of reflection, reflexivity and practical 
judgement, and the agonistic engagement with colleagues. It recommends that managers 
take everyday experience seriously and notice more carefully their own participation in the 
game of organizational life. To do so may make organizations richer and more complex, and 
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